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TOWARD A MODEL WHISTLEBLOWING LAW*
John D. Feerick**
Without question, the adoption of whistleblowing statutes by the
New York State Legislature in 1984,' and the passage of New York
City's own law that same year,2 have represented significant develop-
ments in the field of employee rights. The examination of the effec-
tiveness of these laws by the New York State Commission on
Government Integrity,3 however, has provided cause for concern.
Specifically, the Commission found the existing laws inadequate to
serve their intended purpose - that is, to promote the discovery of
dishonest and improper conduct in the workplace and to offer protec-
tion from retaliation to those who report such conduct.' Indeed, over
the past ten years, New York City, in particular, has witnessed nu-
merous scandals in the public and private sector. From city govern-
ment to Wall Street, this corruption has eroded the public's trust in its
institutions.
The Commission's work also suggests that New York is ready for
another major development in this area as we move into the twenty-
first century. Only through reform can the legitimate fear of reprisal
faced by the most important source of information regarding miscon-
duct - honest employees - be eliminated. Accordingly, this essay
examines the state of the current New York whistleblowing laws and
their shortcomings, and offers a number of proposals intended to al-
* This'article is largely adapted from presentations made by the author at
conferences sponsored by the New York State Law Revision Commission on June 23 and
November 17, 1989. The author acknowledges with deep gratitude the help of Paul
Sweeney, a student at Fordham Law School.
** Dean, Fordham University School of Law; President, New York City Bar Associ-
ation; Former Chairman, New York State Commission on Government Integrity.
1. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 1988).
2. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 12-113 (1986).
3. The New York State Commission On Government Integrity was a seven person,
non-partisan commission created by Governor Mario Cuomo on January 15, 1987, to
investigate ethical practices in state agencies, organizations and local government, and to
make recommendations for reform. Exec. Order No. 88 (1987). Members of the com-
mission included Richard D. Emery, Patricia M. Hynes, Judge Bernard S. Meyer, Bishop
Emerson J. Moore, James L. Magavern, Cyrus R. Vance, and myself as chair.
4. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990s: THE COLLECTED REPORTS OF
THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 689 (Fordham Uni-
versity Press 1991) [hereinafter COMMISSION'S REPORT].
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low whistleblowing laws to operate to their fullest potential., This
essay concludes that state and local lawmakers must work to expand
the scope of the protected conduct, eliminate certain reporting re-
quirements, establish a special investigatory unit, inform employees of
their rights and limit the ability of employers to recover attorney's
fees from whistleblowers.
A. Defining the Meaning and Purpose of Whistleblowing Laws
Whistleblowing laws prohibit an employer from dismissing or tak-
ing other adverse retaliatory action against an employee because the
employee "blew the whistle" on certain illegal or otherwise wrongful
acts of the employer. Retaliation can take many forms, including be-
ing "fired, demoted, denied advancement, harassed or otherwise
harmed." 6
New York State has enacted two whistleblowing statutes; one ap-
plies to the private sector,7 the other to the public sector.' New York
City enacted its own whistleblowing statute in 1986, 9 covering public
employees of the city. 10 Although the protection offered to public em-
ployees by both the state and city laws is greater than what is offered
to private employees with respect to the type of disclosures which are
protected, none of the statutes are sufficiently strong to encourage citi-
zens to speak up when they see their employer acting illegally or
wrongfully, and to protect those employees from subsequent retalia-
tion by the employer. While the state and city should be commended
for their initiative in enacting these protective statutes, the time has
come to strengthen the laws so that the encouragement given to em-
ployees to reveal employer misconduct is unambiguous and the fear of
retaliation is extinguished.
In order to bolster our present whistleblowing laws, it is essential to
understand their underlying purpose. Whistleblowing laws operate to
protect those who take steps to combat dishonesty. Without such
laws, society effectively conveys a message that condones dishonesty.
5. Many of the proposals cited here were made by the Commission on Government
Integrity in its 1990 report. See id.
6. Id. at 688-89.
7. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988).
8. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1992).
9. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 12-113 (1986)
10. Both N.Y. Admin. Code 12-113 and Civil Service Law 75-b are available to a
New York City employee. The New York City law offers the city employee administra-
tive remedies such as reinstatement and possible disciplinary actions against the violator,
while Civil Service Law 75-b offers that same city employee the ability to commence a
private action in court against a retaliatory employer. In order to fully protect employees
of New York City, both laws must be improved.
[Vol. XIX
WHISTLEBLO WING
In other words, the situation in which an employee who calls atten-
tion to wrongdoing is left without a remedy if retaliated against, and
is given, by the absence of such protection, no encouragement at all to
tell the truth, suggests that employer misconduct is something which
must be tolerated.
Whistleblowing laws, however, operate with a very different intent.
In fact, fundamental notions of what is fair, of what kind of tone we
want to set for our society, of what is moral, of what kind of ethical
development we want to stimulate and encourage and of how we feel
about civic duty, are very much present in the subject of whistleblow-
ing laws. These laws challenge the acceptability of allowing employ-
ers to fire employees who see something they believe is wrong and
take steps to call it to the attention of a supervisor, or some investiga-
tive body which has jurisdiction in the area.
The case for applying whistleblowing laws to public employees is
even more dramatic. This is because such laws protect the public by
providing an additional check and balance that insures government
integrity and prevents government corruption which, as we have seen
in recent years, can operate to destroy the fabric of society. It is no
secret that we have been badly damaged in New York by corruption
over the past ten years at both the city and state level. Basic notions
of fair play, therefore, dictate that we assist an employee who believes
that government is corrupt. A law on the subject can increase public
confidence that government misconduct will be reported. Studies
have suggested that in areas of government corruption, particularly
with certain types of misconduct, employees are likely to disclose in-
formation if adequately protected."
In many instances, unless an employee steps forward with informa-
tion, illegal or unethical practices may never be discovered. For ex-
ample, the Commission's investigation of the New York City Mayor's
Talent Bank 2 was sparked by information volunteered by a former
employee of the Mayor's office. Without such volunteered informa-
tion, that system of highly politicized personnel decisions and pa-
tronage abuses may never have been exposed.
Assuming that public employees are more likely to disclose em-
ployer corruption if protected, it follows that the same protection will
11. See, e.g., M. GLAZER & P. GLAZER, THE WHISTLEBLOWERS, EXPOSING COR-
RUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1989); STATE & CITY COMMISSION ON
INTEGRITY IN GOVERNMENT, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHISTLEBLOW-
ING PROTECTION IN NEW YORK (October 8, 1986)(Sovern Commission).
12. See 'Playing Ball' with City Hall: A Case Study of Political Patronage in New York
City", in COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 492-558.
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encourage those in the private sector in a similar fashion. Indeed,
society as a whole is hurt by illegal activities, whether they occur in
the private or public sector, and individuals who inform authorities of
wrongful acts perform a public good. Society should therefore not
tolerate punishment in the form of retaliation against a civic-minded
individual who has acted for the public good by providing informa-
tion on employer misconduct.
The need for statutory protection of whistleblowers in the form of
whistleblowing laws is reinforced by the refusal of the New York
courts to provide such protection through state common law.'3 In-
deed, a number of court decisions have stated that it is the legisla-
ture's responsibility to deal with protection for whistleblowers.14
Without whistleblowing laws, many would-be plaintiffs are left
without a remedy for a retaliatory dismissal. The impact on a person
who loses a job can be devastating. Whistleblowing laws not only
discourage an employer from taking retaliatory actions that result in a
13. In the late 19th century, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the rule that
unless an express agreement exists between the parties, an employment is presumed to be
at-will, terminable by either the employer or employee at any time. See Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). The subsequent decisions of the
courts of New York State reflect an adherence to the at-will doctrine from its adoption to
the current day. For discussion of these cases, see Gary Minda, The Common Law of
Employment-At- Will in New York- The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYR-
ACUSE L. REV. 939 (1985); John v. Dember, New York: The Right To Discharge At- Will
Employees Post Weiner, 3 TOURO L. REV. 133, 134-35 (1986). But see Weiner v. Mc-
Graw Hill, 57 N.Y.2d. 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1981).
14. Recent decisions of the court of appeals in the area of employment law demon-
strate that even whistleblowers are unlikely to find protection in New York's common
law. See, e.g., Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919, 514
N.Y.S.2d 209 (1987); Murphy v. American Home Products, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d
86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1986). Murphy involved a 59 year old plaintiff with a formal
employment contract who was fired after 23 years of service and a series of promotions.
Murphy alleged he was fired not only because of his advanced age, but also in retaliation
for his disclosure of accounting improprieties and his refusal to participate in such impro-
prieties. The court of appeals held that all the causes of action except Murphy's claim for
age discrimination were properly dismissed by the court below. 58 N.Y.2d 293. While it
acknowledged that a number of other jurisdictions have expanded the protection avail-
able to at-will employees, the court suggested that the New York Legislature with its
"infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern the public will, to examine
the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of the various segments of the
community that would be directly affected and in any event critically interested" deter-
mine whether such a change in the public policy of employment law was appropriate. Id.
at 302. Sabetay involved a plaintiff who claimed that he was wrongfully discharged be-
cause he had, in fact, refused to participate in allegedly illegal accounting activities and
instead disclosed these activities to his employer in compliance with corporate policy.
The plaintiff alleged causes of action for breach of implied contract and for tortious con-
duct. 69 N.Y.2d 329. The court of appeals again refused to find any grounds for relief
and once again recommended that if any change is to be made in the nature of employ-
ment relationships, this action should lie with the Legislature. Id. at 336.
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job loss, but on those occasions when retaliation occurs, the employee
is at least afforded a legal remedy.
The arguments that comprehensive whistleblowing laws would
open the floodgates of litigation are misplaced. There is something in
our culture that holds most of us back from blowing whistles and also
from pursuing legal remedies even when we feel we are abused in an
employment situation. For this reason, the advancement of
whistleblowing statutory reform, or for that matter, judicial expan-
sion of rights in this area, is unlikely to open the litigation floodgates.
B. The Effectiveness of New York's Current Whistleblowing Laws
Present New York State law, although a useful beginning, falls far
short of the mark. 5 Under Civil Service Law 75-b, 16 public employ-
ees may be protected from retaliatory acts of an employer if the dis-
closed information concerns an act which the employee reasonably
believes to be improper government action. The statute defines "im-
proper government action" as an act which violates any federal, state
or local law, rule or regulation. 17 Second, the employee must make a
good faith effort to disclose the wrongdoing with a supervisor or man-
ager and allow the employer reasonable time to take appropriate
action.
New York State Labor Law 740 governs private sector employer
retaliation for disclosures made by employees. Labor Law 740 only
protects the private employee who reports a violation of law which
"creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public
health or safety."'" Neither Labor Law 740 nor Civil Service Law 75-
b offers protection to individuals who disclose acts which do not vio-
late the law but are otherwise wasteful or corrupt.
15. Indeed, the protection afforded public employees in a number of other jurisdiction
is greater than what is available in New York. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T. CODE §§ 10540-
10549 (Deering 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-61dd (1990).
16. Section 75-b provides:
A public employer shall not dismiss or take other disciplinary or other adverse
personnel action against a public employee regarding the employee's employ-
ment because the employee discloses to a governmental body information:
(i) regarding a violation of a rule or regulation which violation creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety; or (ii)
which the employee reasonably believes is true and reasonably believes consti-
tutes an improper governmental action.
N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney Supp. 1992).
17. See id.
18. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 1988)
1992] 589
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1. The "Actual Violation" Distinction
When examining the state's whistleblowing laws, there are impor-
tant distinctions in the treatment of public and private sector employ-
ees. Both Labor Law 740 and Civil Service Law 75-b protect the
employee if the disclosed information concerns a violation of law.
However, Labor Law 740 appears to be applicable only when the em-
ployee discloses "or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation
of law." 19 Thus, the private employee is protected when revealing an
employer's actual violation of the law, whereas Civil Service Law 75-b
explicitly protects public employees when the disclosed information
concerns conduct which the employee reasonably believes to be illegal.
This distinction appears to leave the private employee who calls atten-
tion to a situation that falls short of an actual illegality unprotected
from retaliation.
The decision in Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Services2" exempli-
fies the shortcomings of the "actual" violation standard. In that case,
the court interpreted Labor Law 740 to mean that the mere "belief on
the part of the employee that a violation has occurred is not sufficient
to invoke the statute's protection."'" Consequently, although the em-
ployee acted in good faith, she ran the risk of being fired in retaliation
for her disclosure because, according to the court, the facts did not
show an actual violation of law.22
Fortunately, this limitation is not present in the public employee
statute. Civil Service Law 75-b(2)(a) embraces the employee who acts
in good faith and reasonably believes that the information disclosed is
19. Id. Although the Commentaries to Labor Law 740 state that it "could not be the
intent of section 740" to leave good faith and reasonably mistaken employees unpro-
tected, the recent decisions of the New York courts indicate otherwise. See supra notes
21-22.
20. 139 Misc. 2d 970, 529 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1989).
21. Id. at 974, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The facts in Kern indicate that the plaintiff, who
worked at a community residence for the mentally handicapped, witnessed what she per-
ceived to be a rape perpetrated by one resident against another. She reported the incident
to the local district attorney's office and was subsequently dismissed. The plaintiff then
sued under § 740, only to find that she stated no cause of action. The court made the
finding that the intercourse was consensual, did not violate any law and granted summary
judgment.
22. A similar ruling occurred in Bellingham v. Symbol Technologies, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
12, 1989, at 21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In that case a manager who claimed he was dis-
missed for disclosing complaints of sexual harassment made by other employees was dis-
missed. Although the court agreed that sexual harassment is a violation of law sufficient
to invoke the protection of § 740, it refused to find that "such a situation existed in this
case and that the record is barren of any reasonable investigation by plaintiff premised on
an actual violation of law." Id.
590 [Vol. XIX
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true and constitutes illegal or improper government action. 23 The
"reasonable belief" standard, as opposed to an "actual violation"
standard, consequently gives the public employee added protection
not offered to the private employee. In this way, a public employee
can be reasonable, but wrong, yet still remain protected from em-
ployer retaliation. Conversely, the reasonable private employee can
not be wrong and remain protected.
There is little doubt that New York City's whistleblowing law is a
more protective statute. This law protects a public employee when
the disclosure concerns conduct the employee "knows or reasonably
believes to involve corruption ... or conflict of interest."24 This lan-
guage thus employs the reasonable belief standard over an actual vio-
lation standard while at the same time expanding protection to
include disclosures relating to corruption or conflict of interest. New
York City employees, therefore, are protected from retaliation even
when the disclosed conduct is wrongful - but not illegal - and also
when the employee is incorrect, but reasonably believed in good faith
that misconduct occurred.
2. Danger To The Public Health And Safety
The protection offered to private employees by Labor Law Section
740 is also limited to violations which "create[ ] or present[ ] a sub-
stantial and specific danger to the public health or safety."'25 Obvi-
ously, all members of society have an interest in the disclosure of acts
which endanger public welfare,26 but there is, at the same time, an
overriding societal desire to disclose all violations of law, and simulta-
neously to protect those who make such disclosures.
The public health and safety limitation has created an unfortunate
body of case law by leaving whistleblowers who reveal employer
wrongdoings which are unrelated to public health and safety unpro-
tected. For example, private employees who disclose fraudulent activ-
ities by their employers can be fired with impunity.21 Hotel managers
may be fired for refusing to take part in illegal check-cashing prac-
23. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75-b(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
24. NEW YORK, N.Y, ADMIN. CODE § 12-113 (1986).
25. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988)
26. When Labor Law § 740 was enacted, its stated purpose was "to encourage those
at the working level to report hazards to supervisors." The hope was to avoid accidents,
like an elevator crash, the Three Mile Island failure or the space shuttle Challenger explo-
sion, which created actual and immediate harm to the public. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 1988) (Practice Commentary). Today, there is an attempt to move past this
first step and have whistleblowing laws include the promotion of a just, moral and civic-
minded society as their intent.
27. See Littman v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 709 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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tices.28 Employees who decline to participate in the practice of billing
the New York City government for work never performed are also
left unprotected by the whistleblowing law.29 This shortcoming was
also apparent in Kern,3 ° where the court, after finding the plaintiff
stated no cause of action because of the absence of an actual violation
of law, remarked that even if the plaintiff had stated a violation, the
alleged illegality - rape - only created a substantial and specific
danger to a particular individual and not the public at large. Surely, a
statute that provides no remedy for an employee who has the courage
and moral outrage to report what she perceived to be a rape is
indefensible.
An additional problem with Labor Law Section 740 is its failure to
provide legal protection to a member of a profession which follows an
official code of ethics. Indeed, what kind of signal is sent to the public
when a nurse, lawyer or doctor does his or her professional duty only
to find that there is no job protection upon being terminated for per-
forming this duty? The evidence is clear that it is no longer accepta-
ble to limit protection of private sector employees to situations
involving public health and safety.
3. Notice to the Employer and Communications with the
Investigatory Body
When an employee remains anonymous, the fear of retaliation is
generally removed. Thus, one of the best ways to encourage
whistleblowing is to insure the anonymity of the individual who dis-
closes the incriminating information. Unfortunately, the fact that the
first step of the whistleblowing process requires the employee to bring
information of a violation to his or her superiors31 - and thus surren-
der anonymity - serves as a severe deterrent to whistleblowers.
The requirement that employees provide evidence of the miscon-
duct to their superiors first not only provides a disincentive to disclose
wrongdoing, but also creates a situation that gives those superiors
who are involved in the misconduct the opportunity to cover up any
28. See Braig v. Palace Co., N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 1989, at 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16,
1989).
29. Remba v. Federation Employment and Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131, 545
N.Y.S.2d 140 (1989).
30. 139 Misc. 2d 970, 529 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1989). See supra notes 20-21 and accompa-
nying text.
31. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 75-b(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 740(3) (McKinney 1988). N.Y. Admin. Code § 12-113, on the other hand, provides for
city employees to refer evidence in the first instance to the department of investigation,
thus offering possible protection against identification of the employee.
[Vol. XIX
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wrongdoing. This is an untenable situation given the fact that New
York State has created an Office of Inspector General and other kinds
of bodies to function in an oversight capacity, without providing pro-
tection to a public employee who communicates directly with those
bodies prior to contacting a supervisor or an appointed authority
within a particular agency. The fact that many public employees find
it difficult to communicate either to their employer or to an investiga-
tive commission or ethics group further exacerbates the problem.
Certainly, suggesting that an individual has no protection without
first going to his or her employer is likely to lead to very little
communication.
A similarly disturbing aspect of both the public and private New
York State whistleblowing laws is that employees are often not pro-
tected from retaliation for testifying or cooperating with public inves-
tigators. Public employees, unless they believe the information they
are providing concerns a violation of law, are not protected, even
while their testimony is required by subpoena. For private employees,
protection is only available when testifying about the unlawful acts of
an employer which create a danger to public safety and health.
Contrary to state law, the New York City Whistleblowing Law
does protect a city employee who makes out a report to the Depart-
ment of Investigation, a city council member, council president or the
comptroller, and communicates a wrongdoing which invokes subse-
quent retaliation. Nonetheless, like the state laws, there is no explicit
protection for those who testify or cooperate with public investigators.
C. Constructing A Model Whistleblowing Law
What should we expect from a model whistleblowing law? Above
all, the law should not send a conflicting message by dealing with the
subject in an inadequate and superficial way. Accordingly, a model
law should be strong in terms of the protection offered, the mechanics
for enforcing those protections and the manner by which the law is
implemented.
More specifically, New York State should eliminate the health and
safety limitation 32 on private employee protection, thereby bringing
the standards of the public and private statutes closer together. Em-
ployees in both sectors should be equally protected against retaliation
from an employer regardless of the presumed danger to the public
health and safety given that both are performing their civic duty and a
public good by blowing the whistle on employer misconduct. By re-
32. See discussion supra part B.2.
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moving the health and safety limitation in Labor Law 740, the stan-
dards of private and public employee statutes can be equalized to
effectuate this goal.
Secondly, the public employee whistleblowing law's "improper gov-
ernment standard" 33 should not be limited to actual violations of law
since the reporting of conduct beyond lawbreaking also deserves pro-
tection. We are part of a generation that emphasizes ethics, not
merely as expressed in the minimum requirements of law, but as
something beyond mere legal pronouncements. Obviously, all of our
laws have ethical dimensions, but the kind of conduct which we ex-
pect from our public officials exceeds the minimum protection that
might be expressed through statutory means. By limiting
whistleblowing protections simply to violations of law - as Civil Ser-
vice Law 75-b does - the state speaks inconsistently at a time when it
is stressing higher ethical standards. And while New York Code 12-
113 covers criminal activity as well as conflict of interest and corrup-
tion,34 the city law does not protect reports of gross waste of funds
and gross mismanagement. Thus, because we expect, preach and
teach that public servants conform to a higher set of standards than
simply avoiding breaking the law, a model law must account for the
problems of corruption, conflict of interest, abuse of position, gross
waste of funds and gross mismanagement in order to effectuate this
goal.
35
These considerations do not require the same kind of treatment for
private employees. In the public sector, there is a strong public inter-
est in supporting public servants who engage in that higher conduct
by calling attention, for example, to waste involving taxpayers'
money. That public interest is not present with respect to private em-
ployers, since public funds and government activity is not involved.
Thus, this is one area in which I believe there should be an expansion
for public employees only given that the same considerations do not
apply in the private sector.
Another improvement in the Civil Service Law and the New York
City law would be to prohibit retaliatory actions against public em-
ployees who refuse to participate in wrongful activities. Both laws,
although expressly protecting individuals who disclose information,
are silent in instances where employees refuse to participate in illegal
acts.3 6 As a matter of public policy, protection should be provided to
33. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
34. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 12-113(a) (1986).
35. See COMMISSION'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 697.
36. Such protection currently exists in the law which pertains to private employees.
[Vol. XIX594
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those who refuse to join their employer in wrongful acts to the same
extent it is offered to those who provide information concerning the
same acts.
On a similar note, protection should be given to those public em-
ployees who are retaliated against for cooperating with an investiga-
tion by a public body. Certainly, it is discouraging when we fail to
take advantage of the legislative potential to encourage public ser-
vants to assist in ferreting out corruption in order to maintain govern-
ment integrity. This goal can be achieved in part by letting those who
do help know that they will be protected. Thus, when public employ-
ees participate in investigations, hearings and inquiries, they should be
protected by the whistleblowing statute. Furthermore, private em-
ployee protection in this area should be extended beyond investiga-
tions which relate solely to public health and safety.
One of the most important changes necessary to promote effective
whistleblowing laws is the elimination of the notice provision which
requires an employee to give notice to his or her employer or supervi-
sor prior to notifying an investigatory body. Currently, there is no
clear protection in the New York State statute for a public employee
who initially reveals the damaging information to some other agency
such as the Inspector General's Office, the New York State Ethics
Commission or a commission, like the one on government integrity;
instead, the employee first must go to his or her supervisor. This pro-
vision ultimately undermines the effectiveness of -the whole law be-
cause it deters employees who have evidence of wrongdoing from
coming forward by requiring them to make known that contact to the
very object of the disclosure. To correct this problem, New York
State should follow New York City's example and eliminate the em-
ployer notification requirement. A change in this procedure would go
a long way toward insuring anonymity to those who have information
to disclose but fear reprisal.
In terms of a model law, it also seems that employees should not be
left unaided in dealing with evidence of unethical behavior which
comes into their possession. In other words, it is simply unrealistic to
expect an employee to disclose to his or her employer the fact that the
employee is considering revealing information concerning the em-
ployer's unethical conduct. To solve this problem, there should be
some arm of government to which employees might turn for assist-
ance. This service might come in the form of a special unit which
would protect the employee's identity while seeing that an appropri-
Compare N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (2)(b) (McKinney 1988) with N.Y. CiV. SERV. LAW 75-
b (2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
1992]
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ate examination is made, either by the entity in question or by some
other arm of government with respect to the subject matter of the
disclosed information.
A model law also presumes that employers, employees and all parts
of city, state and local government should be made aware of the legal
protection and mechanisms in place for whistleblowing in this state.
These individuals should be instructed on the subject as part of train-
ing programs for government employees. Proper training on the law
will minimize the occurrences of employer retaliation and provide im-
portant help to government.
On a related front, the current statutes contain no posting or em-
ployee communication requirements like those found in whistleblow-
ing statutes in other states.a Similar requirements should be placed
in our laws. This procedure should help eliminate the apparent lack
of awareness of employees regarding the protection provided to them
and the mechanisms which are in place with respect to disclosures of
information of wrongdoing.
As a final area for reform, attention must be given to current attor-
ney's fees provisions. In situations where employees have a right to
sue in court, Labor Law 740 essentially authorizes the employer,
under certain circumstances, to collect attorney's fees against an em-
ployee who chooses to exercise the right to sue.38 The wording of the
attorney's fee provision effectively undermines the very right to sue in
court by stating that if the employee's suit has no basis in fact or law,
the employer may collect attorney's fees from the employee. Further-
more, the fact that the employee may have acted in good faith based
on a belief that there was a wrongdoing makes no difference. An em-
ployee runs the risk, therefore, of assuming substantial legal fee obli-
gations which, when considered, may discourage, at a minimum, the
commencement of a suit in the first instance. Other areas relating to
litigation awards - such as provisions for punitive damages and civil
fines - have also been neglected in the current whistleblowing statute
but are worthy of consideration.
D. Conclusion
It is necessary that each of the three laws discussed throughout this
essay - Labor Law 740, Civil Service Law 75-b and New York City
Administrative Code 12-113 - be reformed so that all employees can
37. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973(e) (1989); MIcH CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.368
(West 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1121 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS 36-15-8 (1990); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 6 (West Supp. 1991).
38. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(6) (McKinney 1988).
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enjoy sufficient protection from employer retaliation, and so that a
high standard of fairness, responsibility and honesty can be promoted
throughout New York State and New York City. Courts must con-
strue the statute as given to it by the legislature. The legislature cre-
ated the actual violation of law statute and the health and public
safety limitations, not the courts. Because of this statutory standard,
only through legislative initiative can the faults be corrected.
In my opinion, it is imperative that we have the strongest law possi-
ble with respect to the subject of whistleblowing. It is not merely
rhetoric when we say that government is, as stated by Justice Bran-
deis, "the omnipresent teacher." In his words, "[flor good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example."3 9 That example is not only
in terms of personal conduct, but it is also in terms of the kind of laws
and the kind of standards we have. The time is ripe for whistleblow-
ing reform.
39. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, L., dissenting).
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